

CENTRAL BANK OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY

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Governor

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Presentation Outline

- I. Policy Challenges**
- II. Monetary Policy Response**
- III. Financial Stability Outcomes So Far**
- IV. Baseline Scenario and Risks**

I. Policy Challenges


Quantitative Easing vs. Quantitative Tightening

- Quantitative easing in major economies has continued in response to weakness in economic activity and heightened sovereign risks, resulting in dramatic increases in central banks' balance sheets.
- Facing huge influx of capital, some developing countries have resorted to quantitative macroprudential tightening, even capital controls.
- Turkey has also initiated quantitative tightening, starting from April 2010.

Rapid Recovery ...

Since mid-2009, the Turkish economy has experienced a rapid recovery, although core inflation remains in line with medium targets.


Growth and Inflation



* I index

Source:: TURKSTAT, CBRT

Capacity Utilization and Unemployment Rates



Source:: TURKSTAT, CBRT


... but unbalanced

Policy Challenges

- *Composition of growth is not balanced - strong domestic demand versus sluggish external demand*
- *Capital flows are strengthening, but its composition is tilted towards short term investments*
- *Credit expansion gaining pace and current account deficit widening rapidly, raising concerns for financial stability*
- *Need for a different, yet prudent approach in monetary policy.*


Domestic vs External Demand

Domestic Demand and Exports
(2008 Q1=100)



Source: TURKSTAT, CBRT

Turkey's External Demand Index*
(June 2008=100)




* The shares of countries within the exports of Turkey and weighted GDP data are employed in the calculation of the external demand index of Turkey.

Source: Bloomberg, Consensus Forecasts, IMF WEO, TURKSTAT, CBRT


Composition of Capital Flows

Composition of Capital Flows
(12-month rolling sum, billion USD)



* After controlling for the effect of change in Decree No. 32
Source: TURKSTAT, CBRT


Finance of Current Account Deficit
(percentage of CAD)



Source: TURKSTAT, CBRT


Credit Growth

Capital Flows and Credit Growth
(percent)



Source: TurkStat, CBRT


Real GDP and Credit Volume
(2008 Q1=100)



Source: BRSA, TurkStat, CBRT

Current Account Deficit

Current Account Deficit
(ratio to GDP, percent)



Source: TurkStat, CBRT

Ratio to GDP	2007	2008	2009	2010*
<i>CAD</i>	5.8	5.7	2.3	6.2
<i>CAD Excl. Energy</i>	1.4	0.1	-1.9	1.6

* As of November 2010, last 12 months
Source: TurkStat, CBRT


II. Monetary Policy Response

Price Stability and Financial Stability


- Interest rate levels required for price stability and financial stability are not always consistent with each other.
- During booms, an interest rate policy that contains inflation could fall short of preventing the emergence of financial risks.
- During a severe recession, in contrast, a much lower level of interest rate may be required to restore financial stability.

The Need for Macroprudential Tools

When the Macroprudential Tools are not Used




When the Macroprudential Tools are used



Macroprudential Tools

- Under the current economic conditions, it may not be possible to simultaneously ensure price stability and financial stability by means of policy rates alone.
- **Solution:** Using macroprudential tools in coordination with all the relevant public authorities.
- **Macroprudential tools:**
 1. *Reserve requirements*
 2. *Liquidity management*
 3. *Capital adequacy ratios*
 4. *Liquidity adequacy ratios*
 5. *Taxes*
 6. *Primary expenditures of government*

Two Targets, Two Instruments



Phases in Monetary Policy


- **Phase-1:** Full liquidity support (after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, September 2008)
- **Phase-2:** Exit Strategy (April 2010)
- **Phase-3:** New Policy Mix (starting from November 2010)

Financial Stability: Objectives

1. **Debt Ratios:** Use of more equity, more prudent borrowing
2. **Debt Maturities:** Extending maturities of domestic and foreign borrowing and deposits
3. **FX Positions:** Strengthening FX positions of public and private sectors
4. **Risk management:** More effective management of exchange rate risk via instruments such as the Turkish Derivatives Exchange


The Policy Rate and Interest Rate Corridor

Policy Rate and Interest Rate Corridor
(percent)



Source: CBRT


Reserve Requirements as a Macroprudential Tool



Source: CBRT


Reserve Requirements as a Macroprudential Tool

Change Since the Start of the Crisis
(percentage point)



Source: Central Banks, CBRT

Current Rates
(percent)



Source: Central Banks, CBRT

Measures by Other Authorities

1. Fiscal discipline
2. No FX loans to households
3. Domestic currency bond market
4. Loan/value restrictions
5. Tax hikes on certain consumer loans
6. Restrictions on credit card borrowing

The New Policy Mix

A lower policy rate, a wider interest rate corridor and higher reserve requirements

- The framework we adopt in spirit is not significantly different from the conventional inflation targeting framework.
- The only difference is that, previously our policy instrument was the one week repo rate, but now our instrument is a “policy mix”
- We seek to use these instruments in the right combination in order to cope with both inflation and macro-financial risks.
- The monetary policy stance in this framework is not only determined by the path of policy rates, but as a combination of all the policy instruments.


Price Stability

- The net impact of the macroprudential policy package implemented—and to be implemented—both by the CBRT and other institutions is on the tightening side.

Price Stability

The Baseline Scenario envisages a gradual tightening by changing the mix of the policy rate and reserve requirement ratios. Such a tightening should not only aim at slowing down credit growth and domestic demand, but also reduce macroprudential concerns.

Inflation and Output Gap Forecasts




Source: CBRT

III. Financial Stability Outcomes So Far

Liquidity


Central Bank Liquidity
(billion TRY)



Source: ISE, CBRT

Tightening the Liquidity


Reserve Requirements Balances
(billion TRY)



Source: CBRT


Volatility in Overnight Rates

Overnight Interest Rates (percent)



Source: ISE, CBRT


Volatility in Overnight Interest Rates (2-week standard deviation)



Source: ISE, CBRT


Volatility in Short Term Swap Rates

Swap Rates
(percent)



Source: Reuters, CBRT


Volatility in Swap Rates
(2-week standard deviation)



Source: Reuters, CBRT

Maturity Extension in Swap Markets


TRY Swap Volumes



Source: Reuters, ISE, CBRT

Maturity Extension in Money Markets


ISE Outstanding Repo Transactions Volumes



Source: ISE, CBRT


Yield Curve and Inflation Expectations

Yield Curve*
(percent)




* Calculated from the compounded returns on bonds quoted in ISE Bills and Bonds Market by using ENS method.
Source: ISE, CBRT

Inflation Expectations*
(percent)



* CBRT Expectations Survey results from the second survey period.
Source: ISE, CBRT


Deposits Yield Curve



Source: CBRT

Maturity of Deposits


Maturity Composition of Deposits
(percent of total deposits)



Source: CBRT

Interest Rates on Bank Credits


Interest Rates on New Bank Credits
(percent, annualized)



Source: CBRT

Initial Impact on Currency

TRY and Other EM Currencies against USD*
(4 Jan 2010=1)




*Average of emerging market currencies, including Brazil, Chile, Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, South Africa, Indonesia, South Korea and Colombia.

Source: Bloomberg, CBRT

Initial Impact on Currency


Real Effective Exchange Rate
(CPI-based, against developing countries, 2003=100)



Source: CBRT

Exports


Goods Exports
(year-on-year percentage change)



Source: TurkStat, Turkish Exporters Assembly, CBRT

Household Loans

Household Loans
(year-on-year change, percent)



Source: CBRT

IV. Baseline Scenario and Risks

The Baseline Scenario

- The Baseline Scenario envisages a gradual tightening by changing the mix of the policy rate and reserve requirement ratios. Such a tightening should not only aim at slowing down credit growth and domestic demand, but also reduce macroprudential concerns.

Continuation of Baseline Scenario

- The possibility of a longer-than-anticipated period of anemic global growth and a long period of quantitative easing by developed economies not only creates downside risks regarding external demand but also suggests that capital inflows may continue at a faster pace.
- Should such a scenario materialize, a policy mix of low policy rate and high reserve requirement ratios may be implemented for a long period.

Risk Scenario – I

- In case, global economic problems intensify and contribute to a contraction of domestic economic activity, an easing in all policy instruments may be required.

Risk Scenario – II

- If the global economy faces a faster-than-expected recovery, global inflation may increase and thus trigger a tightening in the monetary policies of developed economies.
- Materialization of such a scenario would mean higher global interest rates and demand-driven domestic inflation, and thus necessitate a tightening by using both policy rates and reserve requirements.

Risk Scenario – III

- The increases in commodity prices, if they persist, exert risks regarding general pricing behavior, given the strong pace of domestic demand.
- Should such a risk materialize and hamper the attainment of the medium-term inflation targets, there may be stronger tightening than envisaged in the baseline scenario.
- However, the policy mix may vary depending on the developments regarding external demand, capital flows, and the outlook for credit growth.

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