Governor Fatih Karahan's Speech at the Briefing on Inflation Report 2026-IV (İstanbul)

Distinguished Members of the Press, Esteemed Participants,

Welcome to the briefing on the final Inflation Report of 2026.

Recent data indicate that the improvement in underlying inflation has become evident. Regarding services inflation in particular, we value the slowdown in items that have historically exhibited high inertia. Core goods inflation is also at low levels despite cost pressures. 

The impact of our tight monetary policy on demand conditions stands as an important factor shaping these developments. 

However, supply-side shocks triggered by geopolitical developments contain the fall in headline inflation which keeps upside risks to the inflation outlook intact, and requires a cautious stance.

We will maintain our tight monetary policy stance to ensure continuation of the disinflation process and a decline in inflation in line with the interim targets.

Before moving on to our assessments, I would like to remind that as usual, our Inflation Report includes boxes on prominent issues on the agenda as well as our thematic analyses. 

Crude oil and natural gas prices increased markedly in September and October.

While expectations of re-escalation of conflicts weakened after the U.S. elections, the falling risk premium was reflected in prices. 

Despite this fall, energy prices remained above both the previous reporting period’s and the pre-war level.

While the volatility in prices persists, we assess that there are risks in either direction. 

Disruptions in global supply chains continue. 

Following the developments in September, risks increased for the alternative trade routes to the Strait of Hormuz.

Longer trade routes and increased insurance costs significantly drove up the freight rates. Developments in November, however, led to a limited decline. 

Currently, the limited capacity of alternative routes, risks of regional conflicts, high logistics costs, and diminishing stocks continue to affect energy prices adversely. 

Against this background, import prices remain high due to the energy factor. 

Excluding the war region, the war has had a relatively limited impact on the global growth outlook.

We see that the boom in AI investments is a factor offsetting the negative supply shock caused by the war.

The growth outlook varies across countries depending on their exposure to geopolitical developments and technological investments.

As for Türkiye, the external demand outlook is affected negatively due to its strong trade linkages with the region but positively due to the relatively improved growth outlook in a number of other important trade partners. 

In this context, we stick to our projection that external demand will be weak in 2026 but recover slightly in 2027.

Elevated energy prices continue to affect global inflation and inflation expectations.

While differing across countries, headline inflation continues to increase during this reporting period as well.

Short-term inflation expectations maintain their upward trend, while core inflation remains relatively flat.

On the other hand, there is a risk of the global inflation outlook further deteriorating due to potential second-round effects. 

To contain the deterioration in inflation outlook and expectations, many central banks opt for tighter monetary stance than before the war.

Indeed, the Fed and the ECB raised their policy rates in September. 

We also see that the expected interest rate paths of these central banks have shifted upward compared to the previous reporting period.

Long-term bond yields in advanced economies remain high and volatile.

The rise in public debt, increased uncertainty of global economic policies and geopolitical developments, and worsening inflation expectations are among the key drivers of this course.

This also poses a risk to global financial markets.

In addition to geopolitical developments, tightening steps by major central banks and the rise in the long-term bond yields of advanced economies led to a re-acceleration of portfolio outflows from emerging market economies in September.

Inflows that have been observed in the bond markets throughout the war period, ceased in September and followed by some outflows in October. 

ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

Distinguished Guests,

Following the global outlook, I would like to share our assessments of domestic macroeconomic developments now. 

In the second quarter of the year, growth rate slowed down, and realized at 2.3 percent on an annual basis. 

Meanwhile, as a targeted outcome of our tight monetary policy, there was a balanced composition of demand. 

Indeed, final domestic demand significantly lost pace, while net exports contributed positively to annual growth.

Looking at the indicators for the third quarter;

Industrial production declined in the third quarter after posting a significant increase in the second quarter. We see a similar decline when highly volatile sectors are excluded. 

On the other hand, services production increased in the third quarter as of August.  

Capacity utilization rate remains below its historical average. 

After having declined in the third quarter, this rate increased slightly in the fourth quarter as of October. 

The headline unemployment rate is almost flat in the third quarter. 

While the unemployment rate remains well below the historical average, broadly defined indicators point to a less tight labor market. 

In fact, the labor underutilization rate and the number of applications per job postings are at high levels.

As for demand conditions, the slowdown in the growth of retail sales excluding gold continued in the third quarter. 

Adjusted for trend, the deceleration in retail sales is more pronounced.

Card spending remaining almost flat for several quarters also confirms the softening in demand. 

Taken as a whole, data on demand indicators show that demand conditions are at disinflationary levels. 

Both the majority and the average of the output gap indicators point to a negative level also in the third quarter, as has been the case for some time. 

We foresee that demand conditions will remain disinflationary in the coming period. 

Regarding economic activity, I would also like to touch upon foreign trade developments.

Despite challenges in global trade and geopolitical conditions, exports performed well in the second and third quarters.

While the improvement in gold and energy balances contributed positively to foreign trade in the third quarter, imports declined due partly to the weak domestic demand.

Accordingly narrowing in the third quarter the trade deficit widened in October due to the rise in energy prices. 

Here it will be useful to decompose and examine the imports dynamics underlying this deficit.

Energy imports continue to trend upward amid geopolitical developments.

After maintaining its downtrend in the third quarter, gold imports remain relatively flat as of October.

When gold and energy are excluded, imports remain almost flat. 

In terms of goods groups, geopolitical developments are also exerting an upward pressure on prices of raw materials other than energy. This leads to an increase in imports of intermediate goods. 

On the other hand, while consumption goods imports remained below their third-quarter level as of October in line with domestic demand conditions, investment goods imports maintain their current level. 

The overall picture in tourism, an important component of services revenues, present a broadly stable outlook despite the war. 

In the January-September period, the total number of visitor arrivals declined by a small margin compared to the previous year. 

On the other hand, the strong course of average tourism expenditures has offset the decline in the total number of visitors. 

Thus, tourism revenues came in higher than the same period last year.  

In this context, I would like to give a brief account of current account balance developments. 

Since the beginning of the year, the current account deficit-to-GDP ratio has remained flat below the historical average. 

Despite the adverse effect of rising energy prices, the improvement in the foreign trade balance excluding energy led to a limited decline in the 12-month cumulative current account deficit.  

Despite the unfavorable external backdrop, we estimate that the current account deficit remained broadly steady also in the third quarter. 

The moderate course of the trade deficit and the contribution of tourism revenues played a role in this outlook. 

The elevated levels of energy prices pose an upside risk to the trade deficit through higher energy imports and weaker external demand.

On the other hand, softening domestic demand is supporting the current account balance. 

Accordingly, we expect the current account deficit-to-GDP ratio to remain below the long-term average in 2026. 

Distinguished Guests,

Now, I would like to share our current evaluations pertaining to the inflation outlook.

Annual consumer inflation stood at 29.8 percent in October. 

In addition to the elevated levels of food inflation in the first months of the year, supply-side pressures stemming from the geopolitical developments at end-February led to a deceleration in the disinflation process. 

Inflation started to decline after May with the help of the policies that we have been implementing. Nevertheless, recently, this decline lost momentum with the resurgence in energy prices. 

Actually, while annual consumer inflation remained almost flat in October, the decline in the B and C indicators continued.

This divergence suggests that the improvement in other items continue despite energy-driven pressures. 

A breakdown of the divergence by main groups makes the picture clearer.

As of October, annual inflation fell compared to previous year across all main groups except the energy group.

While the deceleration in the services inflation has continued throughout the year, the core goods inflation remains low.  Food inflation, meanwhile, displays a volatile course.

In contrast, the energy group stands apart from all other groups. Annual inflation in this group has strengthened every quarter, reaching 51.4 percent in October.

Therefore, we assess that the deceleration in the disinflation process was mainly driven by the impact of geopolitical developments in energy prices. 

In this regard, I would like to give more detail on energy prices. 

Risks to energy supply increased due to the war and adversely affected domestic energy prices. Rise in the prices of fuels, natural gas, bottled gas and coal stood out in this period.

We have been monitoring the degree of impact of energy price increases on other items, in other words, the indirect impacts, closely.

The panel on the right shows the trajectory of seasonally adjusted price indices where the onset of the war has been set to 100. Energy prices have increased by 43 percent since February, while underlying inflation remained more limited at 17 percent.

In transport services, where energy is a direct cost factor, prices have increased by 28 percent, hovering above the overall services sector. The rise remained limited at 11 percent in core goods. 

This outlook implies that, so far, indirect effects have remained relatively under control. However, we don’t overlook the risk that indirect effects could get stronger if the rise in energy prices become permanent.

Now, let us talk about another supply-side factor: food prices;

Food inflation, which remained elevated in the first few months of the year, played an important role in the deceleration in the disinflation process.

Yet, thanks to more favorable weather conditions this year, agricultural production recovered and food inflation decreased in the second half of the year.

But still, fresh fruits and vegetables prices cause fluctuations in the food inflation.

While inflation in fruits remains moderate owing to favorable crop production conditions, inflation in vegetables diverges from this course.

Leading indicators suggest that the rise in vegetable prices continues in November as well.

In November and December last year, monthly consumer inflation was low, at 0.87 percent and 0.89 percent, respectively, with the contribution of the favorable course of vegetable prices. 

Due to this low base effect, the decline in inflation may halt in November. However, this will not mean that the improvement in the underlying inflation has stopped.

As I have mentioned earlier, monthly inflation can be volatile due to periodical shifts or temporary factors such as one-off supply shocks. Therefore, we shape our monetary policy decisions not on a single month’s data, but on the trend that emerges over several months and the inflation outlook it implies.

Now, I would like to move on to another important component of the underlying inflation: the services inflation.

Deceleration in the services inflation continues despite supply shocks. The weakening in demand conditions confirms  this outlook too. 

As of October, annual inflation in the services group decreased to 36.6 percent. Annualized underlying inflation for the last three months decreased from 33 percent in September to 30.9 percent in October, remaining approximately 6 points below the annual services inflation.

This outlook implies that the decline in the services inflation will continue in the upcoming period. 

Nevertheless, the pace of improvement in the services group is not the same across all subitems. Sensitivity to demand conditions, backward-indexation and the impact of geopolitical developments affect this divergence.

Although education services price increases have slowed down compared to last year, they have exceeded our projections because of the rise in September. 

Communication services inflation, which was 23 percent last year, increased significantly to 43 percent. Yet, price increases in the communication services significantly slowed down over the last two months.

Due to the effects of the rise in fuel prices, annual inflation in transport services is recorded at 42.5 percent, hovering slightly above last year’s inflation.

In contrast, disinflation continues in rents and other services, as well as in the subitems such as restaurants-hotels that have relatively higher sensitivity to demand.

Monthly rent increases, which had hovered significantly above the services inflation for a long time, lost considerable pace in recent months, and stood below the services group.

This shows that inertia in services inflation stemming from the rent item has weakened.

On the right side, you can see the recent trend of rents along with annual consumer inflation. In rents, the annualized underlying inflation went below 30% to the level of annual consumer inflation.

This suggests that the decline in rent inflation will continue in the upcoming period. 

As we have covered services, now I would like to move on to core goods.

Geopolitical developments led to a temporary increase in core goods inflation in April. In the ensuing months, however, we witnessed an alleviation in this pressure.

In fact, the annualized underlying inflation in the core goods group has receded to 11.5 percent, which is below annual inflation.

The slowdown in demand coupled with the mild course in the Turkish lira limited the rise in core goods inflation despite supply side pressures.

These developments point to the role of the tight monetary policy in curbing the spillovers of supply shocks into inflation.

To visualize the extent of the effects of this improvement in subgroups on the inflation trend, I will show you the underlying inflation indicators.

After increasing in the March-June period due to the war, the underlying inflation started to decline as of July.

The monthly underlying inflation was 2.1 percent in the first quarter, 2.3 percent in the second quarter and fell to 1.8 percent in the third quarter on average. It maintained this level in October, as well. 

The annualized underlying inflation, on the other hand, climbed to approximately 30 percent during the war. It receded to 23.7 percent in October, and remained about 6 points below the current annual inflation.

The underlying inflation hovering below annual inflation indicates that annual inflation will converge these levels as supply side pressures subside. 

We attribute this to the effect of our tight monetary stance on demand and the pricing behavior.

The multivariate trend inflation indicator also confirms this improvement in the underlying inflation. 

This indicator had hovered around 2.2 percent on a monthly basis in the start of the year, but receded significantly in the last couple of months and dropped to 1.7 percent in October.

Indicators calculated by different methods point to the same direction, which underpins our assessment regarding the slowdown in underlying inflation.

One of the factors that will determine whether this improvement in the underlying inflation will be permanent is the inflation expectations that we monitor closely also with regard to the secondary effects of supply shocks.

At the onset of the war, we had stated that the medium-term inflation outlook will be shaped by two main channels. The first of these was the possible deterioration in inflation expectations, and the other was the cooling of economic activity. We had underlined that the channel to dominate the other and the resulting direction into which the inflation outlook would evolve, relied on our monetary policy stance.

Now, we see that thanks to our tight monetary stance, the deterioration in inflation expectations has remained limited and the underlying inflation has receded as a result of the weakening demand.

However, the fact that inflation expectations have not improved as much as we projected in the start of the year remains as a risk factor for the disinflation process, and warrants our cautious stance to be maintained.

MONETARY POLICY 

Distinguished Participants,

I would now like to give a brief account of our monetary policy stance and financial conditions.

In the last week of August, we normalized our monetary policy framework and   resumed one-week repo auctions. 

This pulled the overnight interest rates in money markets down from the upper band of 40 percent to 37 percent.

In the October MPC Meeting, we reduced the policy rate by 100 basis points to 36 percent. 

We have actively used liquidity tools and macroprudential framework considering recent developments in financial markets.

Initally, we have taken some measures to contain contagion risks arising from fund market developments. 

We have reviewed the liquidity facilities to provide flexibility in banks’ liquidity management.

We have increased the amount of outright purchases to reduce the volatility in the TLREF market. 

We have excluded loans for the redemption of corporate bonds from growth limits.

Additionally, we have increased loan growth caps considering relatively moderate loan growth path and rising asset quality risks.

Lastly, we have reduced cost of reserve requirement to improve banks’ long term funding conditions and enhance functionality of market mechanisms.

The weighted average cost of funding declined by a total of 400 basis points with the shift to weekly repo funding in August and the policy rate cut in October.

This change has been largely reflected in deposit and loan rates.

The pass-through to loan rates can be influenced by a number of factors, such as bank profitability and credit risk. Our report includes a box on this topic. 

The Turkish lira share may fluctuate due to heightened geopolitical risks and gold price developments.

However, our tight monetary policy stance, along with our supportive macroprudential toolkit, was influential in maintaining residents’ preference for Turkish lira deposits.

Following developments in the fund market, outflows from funds were largely channeled into deposits.

We see that the currency composition of the shift toward deposits is consistent with the current share of the Turkish lira.

In fact, the share of the Turkish lira remains stable, both including and excluding mutual funds. 

Loan growth had accelerated in the fourth quarter of 2025, primarily due to calendar effects, including the year-end balance sheet period.

Loan growth slowed significantly in the second half of 2026.

Along with the tight monetary policy stance, measures such as lowering growth limits and narrowing the scope of exemptions were influential in the slowdown.

As a result, the total loan growth fell from 35 percent at end-February to around 20 percent. 

Looking at growth rates by loan type, we see that Turkish lira commercial loan growth is at 34 percent, while retail loan growth has slowed significantly to 15 percent.

Meanwhile, FX loan growth, adjusted for exchange rate effects, followed a moderate path at 9 percent.

While NPL ratios remain on a gradual upward trend, the total NPL ratio is close to its historical average.

Moreover, the NPL ratio for commercial loans, which account for a significant share of the total, is still below its historical average.

On the retail side, NPL ratios for general-purpose loans and personal credit cards are above their historical averages.

We are closely monitoring NPL developments in retail loans. 

Since the previous reporting period, the short end of the yield curve has declined in line with the fall in funding costs.

Meanwhile, there has been a slight increase in long-term maturities. 

While exchange rate volatility remained low, the country’s credit risk premium saw a modest increase due to recent developments in domestic and international financial markets.

Gross reserves, which stood at 210 billion dollars on February 27, 2026, decreased by 49 billion dollars to 161 billion dollars on November 6, 2026. 

Of this decline in reserves, 28 billion dollars was due to the drop in gold prices.

Net reserves, excluding swaps, decreased by 50.4 billion dollars during the same period, reaching 28 billion dollars. 

MEDIUM-TERM PROJECTIONS

Before moving on to the details of our inflation forecasts, I would like to share our main assumptions  underlying our forecasts. 

As I stated in the beginning of my speech, while geopolitical developments have kept risks to external demand alive, global growth has been more resilient than expected during the early period of the war. Accordingly, we have maintained our assumptions for external demand for both years.

Weakening expectations regarding the normalization of energy shipments through the Strait of Hormuz and escalating tensions in the region have pushed oil prices higher. Based on these developments, we  have revised our assumptions for oil prices upwards for 2026 and 2027.

On the other hand, the rise in natural gas prices has been more pronounced than that of oil prices. Disruptions in energy supply, rising refinery margins, and increasing transport costs also put upward pressure on import prices. Accordingly, we  have revised our import price assumptions upwards for both years.

Additionally, we have raised our food price assumptions based on higher energy and transport costs and the outlook for agricultural commodity prices.

We have built our forecasts on the assumption that the tight monetary policy stance will be maintained. Furthermore, we have also factored in the assumption that the coordination among economic policies will continue.

Now, I would like to share our interim targets and medium-term inflation forecasts. 

In the previous Inflation Report period, we had maintained our interim targets and stated that uncertainties regarding the persistence of the war and the clarification of the MTP (2027-2029) framework would be decisive in assessing the interim targets for 2027 and beyond.

At this juncture, taking into account the control horizon of monetary policy and the updated macroeconomic outlook, we have revised up our interim targets for 2027 and beyond.

Turning to our forecasts, we have revised our year-end 2026 inflation forecast upward to 29.5 percent. We project inflation to decline to our interim targets of 21 percent at end-2027, 13.5 percent at end-2028 and 9 percent at end-2029, before stabilizing at the 5 percent inflation target over the medium term.

This revision to the forecasts was driven by war-related developments.

Continued uncertainty over the course of the war and the expectation that energy prices will remain elevated for longer than anticipated in the previous Report period had an upward impact on the inflation forecasts.

The revision to the food inflation assumption also contributed to the upward shift in the forecast path. 

The MTP (2027-2029) macroeconomic framework and the announced adjustments regarding administered prices have been reflected in the forecasts.

Moreover, another factor behind the upward revision of the inflation forecast path was the more persistent-than-expected impact of the war. This limited the improvement in inflation expectations that we had projected in the previous Report period.

The output gap path has been revised up slightly; however, with tight financial conditions maintained, it remains at levels supportive of disinflation throughout the forecast horizon.

Distinguished participants, 

I would now like to share the most prominent risks to our inflation forecasts and their potential impacts.

Uncertainty concerning the economic outlook remains elevated due to geopolitical developments, volatility in financial markets and commodity prices. 

On the energy front, geopolitical developments continue to be a significant risk factor. In addition, supply-side constraints on the natural gas front also keep upward pressure on energy prices.

As for the food prices, the impact of the war and adverse weather conditions on international agricultural commodity and agricultural input prices remains significant. Moreover, price adjustments in administered items may also heighten such risks. 

On the other hand, developments in domestic supply conditions stand out as a factor likely to cause volatility in both directions, particularly in the unprocessed food group.

Additionally, I would like to stress that supply shocks pose risks in terms of inflation expectations and pricing behavior. The prolonged rise in energy and other commodity prices and the increasing frequency of cost shocks carry the risk of slowing the disinflation process. We closely monitor the second-round effects of these shocks on inflation expectations and firms’ pricing behavior.

Lastly, domestic demand conditions may be weaker than anticipated in our base scenario due to factors such as the lagged effects of monetary policy and tighter financial conditions. This poses a downside risk to our inflation forecasts.

As we set our monetary policy stance, we will continue to assess the direction of risks and their possible effects on inflation expectations with an integrated approach.

Distinguished Participants, 

The disinflation process continues, although it has lost momentum.

The contribution of demand conditions to disinflation process has become evident in this period. We clearly observe the slowdown in inflation in items where the monetary policy has a stronger impact.

Thus, the improvement in underlying inflation continues. 

However, the impact of this improvement on headline inflation is limited, due to supply-side shocks stemming from geopolitical developments. This necessitates the continuation of the prudent stance.

As I have emphasized on every occasion, price stability is a prerequisite for sustainable growth and improvement in social welfare.

For this reason, I would like to reiterate that we will decisively maintain our tight monetary policy stance until price stability is achieved in line with our interim targets.

As I conclude my remarks, I would like to thank all of my colleagues who have contributed to the writing of the Report, primarily the members of the Monetary Policy Committee, the Chief Economist, the Chief Advisor and the staff of the Research and Monetary Policy Department, and everyone that have contributed to the press conference.

Now, along with our Deputy Governors, we can proceed to the Q&A session.

Governor Fatih Karahan's Speech at the Briefing on Inflation Report 2026-IV (İstanbul)