Bargaining on Supply Chain Networks with Heterogeneous Valuations
| Title: |
Bargaining on Supply Chain Networks with Heterogeneous Valuations |
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Number: |
19/07 |
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Author(s): |
Elif Özcan Tok |
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Language: |
English |
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Date: |
March 2019 |
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Abstract: |
In this study, a bargaining between buyers and sellers on a stationary two-sided supply chain network is modelled. Any further restrictions on the network structure is not imposed. Both buyers and sellers are allowed to make offers in the bargaining game. Furthermore, valuations of buyers for the good are heterogeneous. The results reveal that the equilibrium payoffs in the bargaining game that we study depend on the valuations of the buyers and the network positions of all players. As such, these two factors turn out to be the main sources of bargaining power. |
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Keywords: |
Bargaining, Heterogeneity, Networks, Supply chain |
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JEL Codes: |
C78; L14 |
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